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When money is tight and interest rates are high, real estate
development and construction financing in which the lender re-
ceives consideration in addition to the stated rate of interest be-
comes more prevalent. Such additional consideration often takes
the form of participation in the profits of the enterprise, and is
sometimes called the "equity kicker," or contingent interest. The
financial success of the project that the lender is financing deter-
mines the value of the equity kicker or contingent interest.
The lender and borrower may choose to structure project
financing in a variety of ways that will yield a contingent return to
the lender.1 This article will consider one mode in which the lender
seeks to maintain its traditional role as a lender of money instead
of increasing its involvement to become a joint-venture partner of
the builder.
In addition to the return of principal and a stated rate of in-
terest, the lender in the equity participation arrangement would
receive as consideration a percentage of the net profits of the de-
* Associate with the law firm of Valdes-Fauli, Cobb & Petrey, Miami, Florida; J.D.,
University of Miami School of Law; former Articles & Comments Editor, University of
Miami Law Review.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Thomas C. Cobb, Esq. of Valdes-
Fauli, Cobb & Petrey, Miami, Florida, in identifying the primary legal issues arising in equi-
ty financing. The assistance of Linda Ebin, Esq. of Valdes-Fauli, Cobb & Petrey in the joint
liability section is also acknowledged. Any errors and omissions herein are, of course, solely
the author's.
1. For an analysis, primarily dealing with Texas law, of the choice of various entities,
see Barton & Morrison, Equity Participation Arrangements Between Institutional Lenders
and Real Estate Developers, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 929 (1981) (this article considers the tax
ramifications of the choice of various structures for the lender-borrower relationship). In
Glass, The Structuring and Use of Equity Participations by Real Estate Investment
Trusts, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 22 (1972), the author discusses structuring the use of equity
kickers by Real Estate Investment Trusts to comply with applicable provisions of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.
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velopment venture realized from the sale, refinancing, or other dis-
position of the completed real estate project. The financing of a
residential condominium project is considered here.
The contingent interest financing arrangement requires sev-
eral additions to the typical documentation for a development and
construction loan. The typical loan is documented principally by a
promissory note, a mortgage encumbering the project, and a con-
struction loan agreement governing the disbursement of the loan in
stages. The agreement should contain a provision requiring the
borrower to pay to the lender a percentage of the net profits de-
rived from the development and sale of the project. The typical
construction loan provides that the lender will release individual
units from the lien of the mortgage upon payment of a "Release
Price." The release price is usually the greater of either a stated
sum or a stated percentage of the proceeds from the unit sales, and
is applied toward the principal and interest due under the loan. In
a contingent interest transaction, a separate contingent interest
mortgage could be used to secure the contingent interest. The con-
tingent financing agreement would provide that the release price
for units to be released from the lien of the mortgage would be
applied not only to regular principal and regular interest, but also
to the equity kicker or contingent interest.
The net profits of a real estate venture generally consist of the
difference between the gross revenues derived from its sales and
the cost of the project. Because the amount of the lender's equity
participation will depend upon the net profits of the venture, the
borrower and lender will need to agree as to the precise manner in
which the net profits are to be calculated. The lender will advocate
a broad definition of gross revenues and a narrow definition of al-
lowable costs, thus increasing its contingent interest. To the extent
that the borrower can narrow the definition of gross revenues and
broaden its allowable costs, it will succeed in containing the
lender's contingent interest. For example, the borrower may wish
to allocate a greater percentage of overhead to the project than the
lender feels is justifiable.
Additionally, the lender will want to provide that the lien of
the regular mortgage will not be released until the equity partici-
pation is satisfied in full, thus furnishing maximum security for the
contingent obligation. This can be accomplished by a provision
that the last payment of a sum certain will not be applied against
the note and mortgage until the sums secured by the contingent
interest mortgage are paid in full.
[Vol. 38:711
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In an equity participation transaction, the lender will not nor-
mally intend to extend its involvement in the operation of the de-
veloping entity beyond its typical role of positive approval over the
borrower's activities. The contingent interest would be due to the
lender as a lender of money, not as a participant in the develop-
ment process. As will be discussed below, the legal issues are more
unclear when the lender assumes additional active roles. Whether
the lender can escape the additional liability of a joint venturer,
whether it can avoid subjecting the entire transaction to the taint
of usury, whether it can avoid challenges based on the indefinite-
ness of the debt, and whether the contingent interest obligation
will be considered a restraint on alienation, are the subject of this
article.
I. RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION
The lender's equity participation interest will attach both in
the event of a bulk sale of the project, and, more typically, to the
proceeds from the sale of the project, unit by unit. Loan docu-
ments usually include a formula for the release of the lender's par-
ticipation interest in the case of the sale of individual units. When
there is no similar formula for bulk sales, determining the effect of
an equity interest as a restraint on alienation is more troublesome.
A developer holding an equity participation loan who wishes
to make a bulk sale might attempt one of two practical solutions.
The developer might attempt to sell the project subject to the
lender's equity interest. The implementation of this solution
would, of course, be subject to both the lender's and buyer's con-
sent to the assumption. Alternatively, the original buyer might at-
tempt to negotiate a payoff amount with the lender, which amount
would then be deducted from the closing proceeds of the bulk sale.
A problem with this approach is that the lender and borrower
might find it difficult to agree on the amount for such an early
payoff.
As in many negotiations, the degree of mutuality of interest of
the lender and borrower will largely determine the ease in reaching
a solution satisfactory to both. By the nature of the equity partici-
pation arrangement, the lender will benefit most as the borrower
maximizes its profits. The interests of the parties are, therefore,
complementary. Nevertheless, the parties may differ on what
course of conduct will, in fact, maximize profits. The borrower's
entrepreneurial, risk-taking approach may run up against the
lender's more conservative, institutional perspective. While the
19841
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borrower may want to make a bulk sale in order to get its money
out, and go on to seemingly greener pastures, the lender may not
wish to place its security in the hands of a third party and, in a
market with falling interest rates, may not wish to settle for an
early payoff. Thus, while the parties share a mutual interest in the
ultimate profitability of the venture, their different roles may re-
quire complex negotiations prior to any bulk transfer of the
property.
The equity participation interest may well have a chilling ef-
fect on the borrower's ability to convey its property. At best, it can
be said that the equity participation device would neither facilitate
nor simplify the disposition of the owner's interest, because the
lender would not allow a bulk sale without its consent, which
would be tied to an early payoff. Because the probable effect of
such conditions is to impair the borrower's ability to convey its
property, the issue arises as to whether the equity participation
arrangement imposes an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
Although the rule against restraints on alienation is an ancient
one, its purpose could have been conceived by a chamber of com-
merce committee. According to the Florida courts, the rule "is
founded entirely upon considerations of public policy, specifically
the idea that the free alienability of property fosters economic and
commercial development."2
A restraint imposed by an equity participation arrangement
bears a paradoxical relationship to the tests of validity of re-
straints. While the purpose of the rule against restraints "is to en-
sure that property is reasonably available for development by
prohibiting restraints that remove property from a beneficial use
for an extended period of time,"3 the very purpose of the equity
participation arrangement is to provide funding so that the prop-
erty can be developed. Florida courts have held that "[t]he validity
or invalidity of a restraint depends upon its long-term effect on the
improvement and marketability of the property. Once that effect is
determined, common sense should dictate whether it is reasonable
or unreasonable."' 4 Thus, the restraint imposed by the equity par-
ticipation loan can be supported as an interim inhibition that is
part of a larger program to finance, develop, and market property.
The courts have generally shifted from a test based on the "dura-
2. Seagate Condominium Assoc. v. Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484, 485 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) (cita-
tions omitted).
3. Iglehart v. Phillips, 383 So. 2d 610, 613 (Fla. 1980) (citations omitted).
4. Id. at 614.
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tion, type of alienation precluded, or the size of the class precluded
from taking,"5 to the more flexible, common sense test stated as
the reasonableness of the restraint6 viewed in light of the compet-
ing social policies involved.7 Nonetheless, the factors of duration,
type and size can be useful in evaluating the reasonableness of the
restraint.
When the restraint is imposed by a requirement that the gran-
tor, lessor or lender approve any subsequent transfer, its validity
may depend upon the conditions under which approval must be
granted. In Mowatt v. 1540 Lake Shore Drive Corp.," a require-
ment that the board of directors of a cooperative apartment ap-
prove any assignment or sublease by a stockholder-lessee of the
corporation was subjected to the test that it would be validated "if
the power to withhold consent must be reasonably exercised in
light of the purposes of the arrangement, and would be void if it
need not be."9 Similarly, in Davis v. Geyer,10 an agreement stating,
"[n]o sale of said property is to be made by the party of the first
part until the same is approved by the party of the second part,"'"
executed simultaneously with a deed conveying the property in fee
simple, was held void on the basis that it imposed an unlimited
restraint on alienation."
Section 689.18(3) of the Florida Statutes provides a guide for
evaluating the reasonableness of the time during which a restraint
would be effective:
All reverter provisions in any conveyance of real estate or any
interest therein in the state, now in force, shall cease and termi-
nate and become null, void and unenforceable 21 years from the
date of the conveyance embodying such reverter or forfeiture
provision.' 3
While the effect of the equity participation as a restraint oc-
curs in the context of a loan, not in the context of a conveyance,
the rule against perpetuities shares a "common public interest and
5. Seagate Condominium Assoc., 330 So. 2d at 485.
6. Iglehart, 383 So. 2d at 614; Seagate Condominium Assoc., 330 So. 2d at 486.
7. Seagate Condominium Assoc., 330 So. 2d at 485 n.1.
8. 385 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1967), cited in Comment, Debt Acceleration on Transfer of
Mortgaged Property, 29 U. IAMI L. REV. 584 (1975).
9. Mowatt, 385 F.2d at 137.
10. 151 Fla. 362, 9 So. 2d 727 (1942).
11. Id. at 362, 9 So. 2d at 727.
12. Id. at 370, 9 So. 2d at 730.
13. FLA. STAT. § 689.18(3) (1983).
1984]
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purpose ' with the rule against unreasonable restraints on aliena-
tion. Both rules attempt to facilitate the free alienation of prop-
erty. They differ in that the rule against perpetuities deals with
the time of vesting, while the rule against unreasonable restraints
deals with the "duration of a restraint . . . rather than the time of
vesting.
'15
Since a typical construction loan would be for a term far less
than the twenty-one years suggested by the statutory rule against
perpetuities, the conservative lender might wish to adopt the stat-
utory term for repayment of its equity interest. This may be im-
practical, however, in long-term phased developments. Such a limi-
tation may also endanger the lender's security if the project is
stopped and restarted due to economic or market conditions.
Parties seeking to finance a project through granting the
lender an equity participation interest have, then, several means of
avoiding the prohibition against unreasonable restraints on aliena-
tion. First, they can provide that the lender's consent to any trans-
fer will not be unreasonably withheld.'" Second, if the project is
not a phased development, or one for which a protracted buildout
period is anticipated, the duration of the restraint can be limited
to less than twenty-one years. Lastly, the parties can expressly link
the lender's right of approval to the loan program as a whole,
thereby invoking the public policy of promoting economic growth.
The restraint on alienation would then appear not as an inhibition
on the full utilization of property, but rather as a part of a pro-
gram of development.
II. INDEFINITENESS
Unlike conventional mortgage financing, a contingent interest
transaction will not specify the amount of the borrower's obliga-
tion under the contingent interest note and mortgage. Instead, as
noted, the contingent interest mortgage will be for an amount
based on the profits of the venture as they are defined in the loan
agreement. Because of the uncertain nature of the obligation, the
issue arises whether the obligation is too indefinite to be enforced.
This issue is linked to the restraints on alienation problem: the
borrower may not be able to determine how to buy out the lender's
14. Iglehart, 383 So. 2d at 613.
15. Id. at 614 (emphasis supplied).
16. While it is difficult to test such a standard, the reasonableness language does mirror




Any challenge to the enforceability of the contingent interest
mortgage would have to overcome the strong policy of the Florida
courts that "[tihe contract should not be held void for uncertainty
unless there is no other way out.' 7 In Blackhawk Heating &
Plumbing Co. v. Data Lease Financial Corp.,'8 a seminal Florida
case, an optionee sued for specific performance of an option agree-
ment to purchase bank stock which provided, "[a]ny cash flow
benefit, including any tax benefits, derived by Data as a conse-
quence of its holding, hypothecation, assignment, pledge, etc., of
MNB stock shall inure proportionately to Blackhawk in calcula-
tion of any payments due between the parties."' 19 In upholding the
agreement, the court found that the conduct of the parties gave
meaning to the cash flow benefits referred to in the option.20 The
court invoked equitable principles in observing that extreme hesi-
tancy should be exercised before invalidating a contract for indefi-
niteness when one party has performed and the other has enjoyed
the benefits of such performance. 2' After so narrowing the basis on
which a contract can be voided for indefiniteness, the court, quot-
ing Professor Corbin, substantially rejected the indefiniteness ar-
gument unless there is no other way: "If the parties provide a prac-
ticable, objective method for determining this price or
compensation, not leaving it to the future will of the parties them-
selves, there is no such indefiniteness or uncertainty as will prevent
the agreement from being an enforceable contract."22
The court in Tipton v. Woodbury23 cited Blackhawk in fur-
ther narrowing the grounds for the indefiniteness argument. The
court granted specific performance of an oral contract in which the
defendant agreed to sell shares of bank stock to the plaintiff for a
sum certain when the exact amount of stock and the arrangement
for transferring payment were not fixed.24 The apparent good faith
17. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 302 So. 2d 404, 409
(Fla. 1974).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 406.
20. Id. at 408. The court distinguished the option agreement before it from the agree-
ment found in Truly Nolen, Inc. v. Atlas Moving & Storage Warehouses, Inc., 125 So. 2d 903
(Fla. 3d DCA 1961), writ discharged, 137 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1962), in which a lease was held to
be so indefinite that the court refused to enforce it. The lease contract was for "'an appro-
priate advertising sign for the use and benefit of the lessee.'" 125 So. 2d at 905.
21. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 302 So. 2d at 408.
22. Id. at 409 (quoting A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 97, at 146 (1952)).
23. 616 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1980).
24. The case was decided under the provisions of Florida's Uniform Commercial Code,
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of the plaintiff and the circumstances surrounding the transaction,
such as the need for the Florida Comptroller's approval of the
transaction before a written agreement could be signed and the
transfer made, were vital factors in the court's enforcement of the
contract.25 Courts have also enforced contracts containing blank
spaces where the blanks dealt with nonessential contract terms. 6
The cases suggest that an equity participation loan drafted
with Corbin's admonition in mind,27 would not be readily subject
to attack on the basis of indefiniteness. Such documents would
contain objective standards for the calculation of profits, the
lender's profit participation, and the borrower's repayment sched-
ule. The lender's performance of its obligations under the loan
agreement to fund the project would strengthen the enforceability
of the transaction. While counsel may encourage the inclusion of
such objective standards as insurance against the indefiniteness at-
tack, the client may independently desire to resolve these matters
as part of the negotiation of the business of the transaction.
III. USURY
The uncertainty of the amount of contingent interest under an
equity participation loan, giving rise to the indefiniteness objec-
tion, may also give rise to a usury problem under the applicable
law. This will occur if the actual rate, impossible to calculate at the
time the loan is documented, exceeds the permissible rate. Never-
theless, this very uncertainty may save the transaction under Flor-
ida law.
An inherent feature of the contingent interest transaction is
that the interest payable cannot be specified as a percentage of the
amount loaned. Indeed, the amount of the contingent interest obli-
gation is, by definition, uncertain at the time the loan is docu-
mented. Whether the contingent obligation would be considered to
be interest is a critical inquiry.
If the contingent obligation is found to be interest for usury
purposes, and it causes the effective rate of interest on the loan to
exceed the applicable usury limits, the transaction will be subject
which is found in chapter 67 of the Florida statutes, and establishes a lesser standard of
proof for the existence of an oral contract. Id. at 176. The indefiniteness argument would be,
however, equally germaine to cases falling outside the Code.
25. Id. at 175-76.
26. Innkeepers Int'l, Inc. v. McCoy Motels, Ltd., 324 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975),
cert. denied, 336 So. 2d 106 (1976).
27. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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to a harsh penalty. Florida law provides that any person, agent or
officer willfully violating the Florida usury statute "shall forfeit the
entire interest so charged, or contracted to be charged or reserved
. ... 28 The statute specifies that the lender would be allowed to
collect only the principal amount of the loan. This penalty applies
whether or not usurious interest was ever collected by the lender.
If the lender actually receives the usurious interest, an additional
penalty is imposed by statute.29 In that event, the lender must for-
feit double the amount of interest actually collected. If the rate of
interest exceeds twenty-five percent, an action for the entire prin-
cipal is also unenforceable in Florida. 0 If the rate of interest falls
between twenty-five and forty-five percent, the lender would be
guilty of a second degree misdemeanor." If the rate of interest ex-
ceeded forty-five percent, the lender would be guilty of a felony of
the third degree.2
Under Florida law, there are four elements of a usurious
transaction:
(1) There must be a loan express or implied; (2) An understand-
ing between the parties that the money lent shall be returned;
(3) That for such a loan a greater rate of interest than is allowed
by law shall be paid or agreed to be paid, as the case may be;
and (4) There must exist a corrupt intent to take more than the
legal rate for the use of the money loaned.3
The allowed rate of interest is discussed later with the pre-
emptive role of federal legislation. With the possible exception of
this third element, the fourth requisite of "corrupt intent" has led
to the most complex definition. 5
While the corrupt intent requirement may appear to have
such unsavory connotations that the typical prudent lender would
feel absolved from any such motives, the Florida courts have, in
fact, broadened its applicability so that corrupt intent may well be
present in an otherwise typical mortgage transaction. Corrupt in-
tent is not gauged simply by a mathematical computation, but is,
28. FLA. STAT. § 687.04 (1983).
29. Id.
30. FLA. STAT. § 687.071(7) (1983).
31. FLA. STAT. § 687.071(2) (1983).
32. FLA. STAT. § 687.071(3) (1983).
33. Dixon v. Sharp, 276 So. 2d 817, 819 (Fla. 1973) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
34. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
35. For purposes of this discussion, the first and second elements of usury can be
treated at face value.
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instead, "determined from all the circumstances surrounding the
transaction . ".3..'6 For example, the bargaining position of the
parties is one such circumstance.
Corrupt intent does not require the lender "to consciously de-
cide to charge a borrower greater than the legal rate, when the
lender consciously intends and does in fact make the charges which
add up to usury. '37 If the equity participation is deemed interest
for usury purposes, the lender may be charged with corrupt intent
even if it negotiated its equity participation in good faith. One area
of concern arises in estimating the amount of contingent interest.
The lender may underestimate the profitability of a project, con-
templating a contingent interest that will fall within usury limits.
If the venture is successful beyond expectation, the lender's intent
can be subject to attack.
In light of the broad definition of corrupt intent and the ease
of meeting the remaining elements of the usury test, the conserva-
tive lender may desire to expressly limit all interest, both fixed and
contingent, to applicable usury ceilings, or otherwise ensure that
the transaction falls within an exception to the usury doctrine.
The contingency rule, a doctrine with a long historical basis,
may assist the lender in avoiding usury limits. As early as 1912, the
Florida Supreme Court said in dicta that shared loss and partici-
pation in control or management may allow the lender to charge
more than the statutory rate without being subject to usury penal-
ties.38 Florida has since codified the contingency rule excepting cer-
tain contingent obligations from the interest limits set by the
usury statutes.
The statute commonly known as the "equity kicker" statute,
provides:
If ... a loan, advance of money, line of credit, forbearance, or
other obligation exceeds $500,000, then ... interest on that
loan, advance of money, line of credit, forbearance or other obli-
gation shall not include the value of property charged, reserved,
or taken as an advance or forbearance, the value of which sub-
stantially depends on the success of the venture in which are
used the proceeds of that loan. . . . Stock options and interests
36. Dixon v. Sharp, 276 So. 2d 817, 822 (Fla. 1973).
37. Abramowitz v. Barnett Bank, 394 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (citations
omitted), remanded, 419 So. 2d 627 (1982).
38. Cooper v. Rothman, 63 Fla. 394, 403, 57 So. 985, 987 (1912); see also Kmiec, Shared
Appreciation Mortgages: Step Toward Making Housing a Bad Investment, 10 REAL EST.
L.J. 302, 312-13 (1982).
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in profits, receipts or residual values are examples of the type of
property the value of which would be excluded from calculation
of interest under the preceding sentence."
The statute's common law and code precursors are helpful in as-
sessing its impact and applicability.
The classic statement of the contingency rule is contained in
the Restatement of Contracts, which provides:
CONDITIONAL PROMISES FOR PROFIT EXCEEDING THE
PERMISSABLE RATE OF INTEREST.
A promise, made as the consideration for a loan or for extending
the maturity of a pecuniary debt, to give the creditor a greater
profit than the highest permissible rate of interest upon the oc-
currence of a condition, is not usurious if the repayment prom-
ised on failure of the condition to occur is materially less than
the amount of the loan or debt with the highest permissible in-
terest, unless a transaction is given this form as a colorable de-
vice to obtain a greater profit than is permissible. In that case it
is usurious.4"
The Restatement provides several tests for determining whether a
transaction falls within the contingency exception, but the success-
ful application of these tests depends upon their further definition
by case law. For example, the creditor is entitled to the return of
the principal plus interest at the highest lawful rate and, according
to the Restatement, must contract for a materially lesser return in
order to be eligible for the exception. The Restatement balances
the scope of risk with the extent of contingent profit to gauge the
exception's applicability. Whether risking some part of the interest
39. FLA. STAT. § 687.03(4) (1983). For a useful discussion of the usurious effect of the
lender's equity position, see Hadlow and Legler, Florida's General Usury Law 44 FLA. B.J.
570, 573-74 (1970) (the article was written prior to the passage of the "equity kicker stat-
ute"); see also Anderson, Tight-Money Real Estate Financing and the Florida Usury Stat-
ute, 24 U. MIAMI L. REV. 642 (1970). Like shared appreciation mortgages, commercial equity
participation loans involve an absolute obligation to repay a stated principal amount plus a
contingent interest obligation of an indeterminate sum. Annot., 16 A.L.R. 3d 475 (1967).
40. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 527 (1932). Comment a provides:
Usury laws do not forbid the taking of business chances in the employment of
money. A creditor who takes the chance of losing all or part of the sum to which
he would be entitled if he bargained for the return of his money with the highest
permissible rate of interest is allowed to contract for greater profit. On the other
hand it is not permissible to use this form of contract as a device for obtaining
usurious profit. If the probability of the occurrence of the contingency on which
the diminished payment if promised is remote, or if the diminution should the
contingency occur is slight as compared with the possible profit to be obtained if
the contingency does not occur, the transaction is presumably usurious.
See Kmiec, supra note 38, at 312 n.47 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 527 (1932)).
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permitted by statute is sufficient, or whether some portion of the
lender's principal must be jeopardized in order to meet the materi-
ality standard, is left unclear.
In Diversified Enterprises, Inc. v. West,41 a private investor
made a series of loans so that the defendant-purchaser could close
his purchase of property. The plaintiff-investor's first advance of
$10,000 cash was secured only by an oral promise to repay. A sub-
sequent advance of $30,000 was secured by two notes of $10,000
each, and the assignment of an option of additional acreage ac-
quired for $10,000. In defending against the plaintiff's action for
recovery on the notes, the defendant alleged that the two notes
were given as security for the initial advance of $10,000, giving the
plaintiff a usurious return of one hundred percent. The plaintiff
argued that the transaction should be viewed as a whole, and "that
the two notes were given to him to reduce to $20,000 the amount of
risk-capital he would have in the option, and in addition to secure
his return of the other $20,000. ' ' 2 In upholding the transaction
against the usury defense, the court relied on several principles.
The court preferred an interpretation of the transaction that
would render it lawful.4
The defendant was required to establish his charge by "clear
and satisfactory evidence," 4' and, in considering the transaction,
the agreement and the intent of the parties were carefully scruti-
nized." ' The court upheld the transaction against the usury defense
in view of the fact that the plaintiff's only requirement was that
the $40,000 loaned to the defendant be repaid, and that the plain-
tiff had only two $10,000 notes plus the option to secure the debt."
The option's role in the transaction caused it to fall within the
scope of the contingency exception, as it appeared that the plain-
tiff sacrificed full security for his debt for the speculative profit
that the option might provide.47 The court cited the rule that "the
lender may lawfully require, in return for the risk, as large a sum
as may be reasonable, provided it is done in good faith,""' and that
"mere colorable hazard will not preclude excessive interest charges
41. 141 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962).
42. Id. at 29.
43. Id. at 30.
44. Id. at 29.,
45. Id. at 30.
46. Id.
47. Plaintiff ultimately sold the option for $60,000. Id. at 29.
48. Id. at 30.
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from being usurious."4 The profit from the sale of the option was
treated as interest, and cleansed from the taint of usury because of
its speculative nature."
The contingency exception has also been applied to preferen-
tial participation in profits granted to certain stockholders of a
condominium development corporation. In Little v. Caswell-
Doyle-Jones Corp.,5 the stockholders had made loans to the cor-
poration that provided equity financing for the project. The loans
were evidenced by notes that provided for interest at the annual
rate of six percent; a separate stockholders agreement granted the
stockholders their proportionate share of the cash remaining after
the notes were paid. The stockholder-creditors were to receive a
preferential distribution amounting to one half of their loans.2
The corporation defaulted on the notes and the stockholders sued
the guarantors to recover; the guarantors raised the affirmative de-
fense of usury. The appellate court overturned the trial court's
holding that the preferential distribution was in actuality usurious
interest, finding that neither the corporation nor the guarantors
had any fixed obligation to pay more than principal and interest.
Invoking the principle that "freedom of contract as between share-
holders of competent understanding is not a contract to be rewrit-
ten by the courts,"5 the court applied the contingency exception.
That two individual mortgagees were granted profit participa-
tions which, if earned, would have yielded a return of thirty to
thirty-five percent did not invalidate the transaction in Schwab v.
49. Id. at 30 (citations omitted); see also Goodman v. Olsen, 305 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1974),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975). The Goodman court, applying the New York version of
the contingency rule, stated:
[A] loan is usurious where the lender is entitled to the return of the princi-
pal and the full legal rate of interest plus a bonus to be paid upon a contingency
over which the borrower has no control ...
However, an agreement to pay an amount which may be more or less than
the legal interest, depending upon a reasonable contingency, is not ipso facto
usurious, because of the possibility that more than the legal interest will be paid.
Id. at 755 (emphasis added). The court also referred to the principle under New York law
that a loan is not usurious "where the money is in fact advanced for the purpose of a joint
venture . . . or where there is no certainty that the bonus plus the stipulated interest will
exceed the legally allowable rate of interest." Id. (emphasis in original). In American Insur-
ers Life Co. v. Regenold, 243 Ark. 906, 423 S.W.2d 551 (1968), the Supreme Court of Arkan-
sas held that a loan, where the creditor took no great risk of losing either principal or inter-
est but yet received one-half of the profits from the ultimate sale of land, was usurious.
50. West, 141 So. 2d at 31.
51. 305 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).
52. Id. at 844.
53. Id.
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Quitoni.5 4 The mere existence of an unearned equity kicker in loan
documents is not a sufficient basis on which to subject the lender
to any usury penalty.
Florida case law applying the contingency exception, does pro-
vide some guidelines. First, it is notable that the several cases deal-
ing with the exception involve private, not institutional lenders.5
When the lender's advance is not fully secured, and when the pos-
sibility of loss of principal is balanced by the opportunity for spec-
ulative gain, the transaction is not usurious. 6 Corporate sharehold-
ers may contract for the preferential distribution of profits, which
if treated as interest, would render the transaction usurious when
the shareholders have made a loan to the corporation that obli-
gates the corporation and guarantors to make no payments other
than principal and interest.5 7 The rule of Schwab v. Quitoni58
merely appears to exempt documented but 'unearned contingent
interest from inclusion in interest for usury purposes.
Florida case law does not clearly resolve the question raised
but left ambiguous by the Restatement; 9 that is, whether a lender
who places statutory interest but not principal at risk in return for
the opportunity for speculative profit is subject to usury limits.
The language of the Florida "equity kicker" statute"0 liberalizes
and clarifies its Code predecessor in expressly excluding contingent
interest from usury calculations.
A liberalizing trend in Florida usury law is also apparent in
the willingness of Florida courts to recognize a choice of law provi-
sion in the loan agreement, when the chosen law permits the
lender to charge a higher rate of interest than permitted under
Florida law. In Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key,
Inc.,61 the Supreme Court of Florida held that a choice of law pro-
vision would be upheld "so long as the jurisdiction chosen in the
54. 362 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). The profit participation was never earned as the
project failed, and the mortgagees foreclosed. Id. at 297. The participation was tested, how-
ever, when the mortgagors raised the affirmative defense of usury in the foreclosure action.
Id. at 297-98. The court cited Diversified Enters., Inc., v. West, 141 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 2d DCA
1962), for the principle that the usury defense must be clearly and satisfactorily proven.
Schwab v. Quitoni, 362 So. 2d 297, 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
55. See supra notes 38, 41, 51-54 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
58. 362 So. 2d 297. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
60. FLA. STAT. § 687.03(4) (1983). See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
61. 395 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1981).
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contract has a normal relationship with the transaction. 6 2 The
court found that such a normal relationship did exist when Conti-
nental Mortgage Investors, a Massachusetts business trust, made a
loan to a Florida corporation secured by a mortgage on Florida real
estate. The lender's investment advisor, a separate entity based in
Coral Gables, Florida, originated the loan and prepared the loan
documents. The loan closing took place in Massachusetts, and the
loan was made payable in Massachusetts. Further, the lender's
only office was in Massachusetts. The supreme court reversed the
district court's decision that the selection of Massachusetts law
was a sham intended to evade Florida usury law and reversed the
district court's finding that, notwithstanding the equity kicker
statute, the lender's receipt of fifty percent of the borrower's stock
caused the transaction to be usurious. 3 The supreme court also
disagreed with the district court's finding that usury laws represent
a strong public policy of the state. In view of the commercial set-
ting of the case, the court held that the public policy of upholding
normal choice of law rules was stronger than "any overriding pub-
lic policy against usury qua usury in a choice of law situation."'64
The court did not consider the usurious effect of the lender's stock
interest in the borrower corporation, as it found the conflict of laws
issue to be dispositive.e5
Federal law may also play an important role in determining
what usury limits apply to a loan transaction. The Depository In-
stitutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 19800
(DIDMCA) provides that:
[any state law] expressly limiting the rate of amount of interest,
discount points, finance charges, or other charges which may be
charged, taken, received, or reserved shall not apply to any loan,
mortgage, credit sale, or advance which is
(A) secured by a first lien on residential real property
(B) made after March 31, 1980; and
(C) described in section 527(b) of the National Housing
Act (12 U.S.C. 1735 f-5(b)) . . .
62. Id at 508.
63. 395 So. 2d 507 (1981), rev'g 354 S. 2d 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
64. 395 So. 2d at 510.
65. Id. at 507.
66. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter DIDMCA]. The Act preempts state usury ceilings from April 1, 1980.
67. Id. § 501.(a)(1), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-399, § 308(c)(6), § 324(a) (1980) (codi-
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The purpose of the Act is to "ease the severity of the mortgage
credit crunches of recent years," to stabilize the financial system,
and to encourage a national housing policy.6" It is interesting to
note that the conditions that led to the Act's passage, namely tight
credit and rising interest rates, are also the factors that encourage
equity financing arrangements.
Congress preempted state law with the Act through the power
granted to it by the supremacy clause of the United States Consti-
tution."' Since the Act effects the availability of credit, the com-
merce clause provides an additional avenue for preemption.7 Al-
though the validity of the DIDMCA has not been tested beyond
the Supreme Court of Arkansas,71 the ruling of the United States
Supreme Court in Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. de
la Cuesta72 affirnied federal preemptive authority in a different, al-
though analogous setting. The case confirms the power of the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board to exclusively regulate and override
conflicting state regulations regarding "due-on-sale clauses." The
due-on-sale clause is "a contractual provision that permits the
lender to declare the entire balance of a loan immediately due and
payable if the property securing the loan is sold or otherwise trans-
ferred. ' 7 The Federal Home Loan Bank Board issued regulations
confirming the power of savings and loan associations to enforce
due-on-sale clauses because it felt that any restriction on such en-
forcement would endanger the stability of the institutions, would
lead to a general increase in interest rates, and would reduce avail-
ability of funds for residential loans by making loans unsaleable in
fled at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 (1982)). This section goes on to provide, in part, that the limita-
tion contained in the National Housing Act to residences "designed principally for the occu-
pancy of from one to four families shall not apply[.]" Id. at § 501(a)(1)(C)(i). The
applicability of other provisions of the National Housing Act is discussed infra.
68. S. REP. No. 368, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 236, 254.
69. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See McInnis v. Cooper Communities, 271 Ark. 503, 611
S.W.2d 767, 769-70 (1981). The court determined that the DIDMCA is a valid exercise of
congressional authority, and concluded that the loan under consideration was not usurious
because it was within the limits set by the federal act. 271 Ark. at 507-08, 611 S.W.2d at 772.
See also Sanders v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Assoc. 393 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. La. 1975) (Federal
regulation, 24 C.F.R. § 221.525 (1977), concerning late charges on a mortgage was reasonable
and within the delegated authority granted by Congress; the court held that the regulation
preempted, and was supreme over, state law).
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
71. McInnis v. Cooper Communities, 271 Ark. 503, 611 S.W. 2d 767 (1981).
72. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).




The due-on-sale controversy thus arose out of the same regu-
latory environment that surrounds the DIDMCA: an economy in
which rising interest rates and tight credit threaten the normal
functioning of the housing market and its financial sources. As
noted, these economic factors relate closely to the business consid-
erations that prompt the lender and the borrower to enter into an
equity financing transaction.
The Act provides that each state may reimpose usury ceilings
by adopting a law expressly stating that it "does not want" the Act
to apply. 75 The preemption is permanent, subject to the right of
any state to overrule it by April 1, 1983.76 Florida has not over-
ruled the Act.
In order to fall within the boundaries of federal preemption, a
transaction must meet several requirements. The loan must "be se-
cured by residential real property. ' 77 Counsel to the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board has applied a "primary use" test to determine if
a structure is residential. This test "will be satisfied if over half the
value or over half the area of the structure is attributable to resi-
dential use." 78 The Board has also ruled that "a developer of a rec-
reation, vacation, and retirement community whose business con-
sists of selling lots in such communities ' 79 qualifies as a seller of
residential real property. In addition, the Board has included cer-
tain forms of timesharing interests in its definition of residential
real property.80 These broad interpretations of the residential real
property requirement extend the availability of federal preemption
to equity financing for various types of development ventures.
To be eligible for federal preemption, a lender must make or
74. Id. at 146 (citing 41 Fed. Reg. 6283, 6285 (1976)).
75. See DIDMCA § 501(a)(1)(C)(2)(B)(2). The state override would apply from April 1,
1980.
76. DIDMCA § 501(a)(2)(B)(2).
77. See id. at § 501(a)(1)(C)(ii). The Act provides that this requirement "shall not ap-
ply to a loan secured by stock in a residential cooperative housing corporation or to a loan
or credit sale secured by a first lien on a residential manufactured home[.]" Id.
78. Letter from Ira L. Tannenbaum, Acting General Counsel to the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (March 31, 1981). This and other letters referred to infra are available from the
information services of the Office of the General Counsel to the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board "is authorized to issue rules and regulations
and to publish interpretations governing the implementation" of the Act. DIDMCA § 501(f).
79. Letter from Jerome S. Plapinger, Special Counsel for Milan C. Miskovsky, General
Counsel to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (June 20, 1980).
80. Letter from Rebecca H. Laird, Senior Associate General Counsel to the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (August 11, 1981).
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invest more than $1,000,000 in such residential loans annually.81
This requirement is satisfied if the lender makes $1,000,000 in
loans in the current fiscal or calendar years, or has made them in
the prior fiscal or calendar years.82 If, however, individually li-
censed subsidiaries of a common parent together meet the million
dollar threshhold, this would not satisfy the requirement."3 Only
active lending transactions qualify; a mere static investment port-
folio would not.84 Finally, the term "creditor," under the statutory
definition, does not apply to parents or holding companies, but
only to the immediate creditor.8 5 For the sizable institutional
lender that makes a large volume of construction loans for residen-
tial or mixed use developments, it is probable that the lender will
easily reach the $1,000,000 a year minimum.
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has issued several other
interpretive rulings which confirm that federal usury preemption is
available in the typical equity financing transaction.
The Board has ruled that a property acquisition and develop-
ment loan used to finance overhead as well as direct construction
costs would qualify under the DIDMCA, when "guarantees and
other non-land collateral represent a minor portion of the total
value of the collateral."8 " Further, the Board has ruled that the
number of units financed by the loan is not material, as neither the
Act nor the implementing regulations place a limit on project
size. 7 Thus, an equity financing transaction for a large project se-
cured in part by collateral other than the land would not be dis-
qualified per se from federal preemption.
A lender who, for title insurance reasons, required two notes in
"pari passu" and "of equal dignity" to evidence the debt was not
prevented from being eligible for usury preemption. 8 By analogy,
the equity financing transaction in which the contingent interest
81. See DIDMCA § 501(a)(1)(C)(v).
82. Letter from Rebecca H. Laird, Senior Associate General Counsel to the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (March 31, 1981).
83. Letter from Rebecca H. Laird, Senior Associate General Counsel to the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (July 21, 1982) (citing DIDMCA § 501(a)(1)(C)(V)). Ms. Laird does
state that junior mortgages can be applied toward the million dollar figure.
84. Letter from Rebecca H. Laird, Senior Associate General Counsel to the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (August 5, 1981).
85. Laird, supra note 11 (citing DIDMCA § 602).
86. Letter from Jerome S. Plapinger, Special Counsel for Milan C. Miskovsky, General
Counsel to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (June 30, 1980).
87. Id.
88. Letter from Jerome S. Plapinger, Special Counsel for Milan C. Miskovsky, General
Counsel to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (August 8, 1980).
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obligation is secured by a separate note and mortgage would be
available for federal preemption. The Board has also confirmed
that construction lending is included in the coverage of the
DIDMCA. s9 Thus, although equity financing has not yet been ad-
dressed in an interpretive ruling, the Board's policy of broadly con-
struing DIDMCA9 0 and its approval of various elements analogous
to those used in such a transaction indicate that it would be eligi-
ble for federal usury preemption.
Assuming that any state usury ceilings would be preempted by
the federal statute, the parties must determine what usury limita-
tions, if any, apply to the transaction. Section 52291of the
DIDMCA provides that preempted savings and loan associations
may charge
interest at a rate of not more than 1 per centum in excess of the
discount rate on ninety-day commerical paper in effect at the
Federal Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve district where such
institution is located or at the rate allowed by the laws of the
State, territory, or district where such institution is located,
whichever may be greater.2
Any institution charging in excess of this rate of interest shall,
when such charge is knowingly made, forfeit all interest due under
the loan. The same interest ceiling and penalty for its breach apply
to state banks or insured branches of foreign banks.93 On business
and agricultural loans, the preempted lender may charge not more
than five per cent in excess of the discount rate as defined above. 4
In accordance with the authority granted by the Act,95 the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board has ruled, in view of the Comp-
troller of the Currency's interpretation, that "the most favored
lender doctrine allows national banks to charge the highest rate
89. Letter from Jerome S. Plapinger, Special Counsel for Milan C. Miskovsky, General
Counsel to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (No. 000060).
90. The Board has stated "that section 501 is a remedial statute and should be con-
strued broadly." Letter from Rebecca H. Laird, Senior Associate General Counsel to the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (July 22, 1981) (citing Braugh v. Corpus Christi Bank &
Trust, 605 S.W.2d 691, 696-97 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)).
91. DIDMCA § 522, amended by Pub. L. No. 97-457 (1983) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1730(g) (1982)) (amending Title IV of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1724 by adding
§ 414).
92. Id.
93. DIDMCA § 521 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831(d) (1982)) (amending the Federal De-
posit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1811 by adding § 27).
94. DIDMCA § 511(a), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-399, § 324 (b-d) (1980) (codified at
12 U.S.C.' § 1730(g) (1982)).
95. See supra note 78.
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available on a class of loans when making that type of loan." ' The
highest rate would be either the floating rate based on the Federal
Reserve discount rate as established in section 522 of the
DIDMCA, "or the rate allowed to the most favored lender on the
particular class of loans under state law whenever the greater of
either of these rates exceeds the rate the institution is permitted to
charge by State law."97
Florida law exempts institutions making loans secured by liens
on real estate from the state usury ceiling, even without reference
to the DIDMCA. Section 665.077 of the Florida Statutes exempts
from usury limits loans by savings and loan associations secured by
first liens on real estate. Florida's interest parity statute99 permits
out-of-state national banks to take advantage of the usury exemp-
tion granted to savings and loan associations.
While the interrelationship of state and federal law may ap-
pear to be a tangled web, it also creates great latitude for structur-
ing an equity financing transaction in which the lender's contin-
gent interest is not subject to rigid usury limits.
Several avenues are available. First, the lender can take com-
fort from the Florida equity kicker statute's exclusion of any re-
turn "the value of which substantially depends on the success of
the venture" 100 from interest for usury purposes. Second, if the
96. 46 Fed. Reg. 13988 (1981) (citing 12 C.F.R. § 7.70 310(a) (1983)) (Most Favored
Lender status codified at 12 C.F.R. § 570.11 (1983)).
97. 12 C.F.R. § 570.11(a) (1983).
98. The statute reads as follows:
Collection of fines, interest, or premiums on loans made by as-
sociations.-No fines, interest, or premiums paid on the following loans made
by any association shall be deemed usurious, and the same may be collected as
debts of like amount are now collected by law in this state and according to the
terms and stipulations of the agreement between the association and the
borrower:
(1) Loans secured by a first lien on real estate.
(2) Loans secured by savings accounts to the extent of the withdrawal value
thereof.
(3) Loans secured by the pledge of those loans described in subsections (1) and
(2) and by the pledge of investments of a type in which the association is author-
ized to invest, provided the loans and investments so pledged shall be subject to
all restrictions and requirements which would be applicable were the association
to invest directly in such loans or investments.
(4) Loans secured by a wrap-around mortgage, inferior to the first mortgage, in
which the mortgagee is contractually obligated to make the payments required
under the first mortgage.
FLA. STAT. § 665.077 (1983).
99. FLA. STAT. § 687.12 (1983).
100. FLA. STAT. § 687.03(4) (1983). See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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transaction has a "normal relationship"'' 1 to a jurisdiction, other
than Florida, having more favorable usury laws, the parties can se-
lect the law of that jurisdiction to govern the transaction. Third, if
the lender makes or invests in more than $1,000,000 in qualifying
loans secured by residential real property, the lender may be able
to rely on the preemptive effect of federal law. 102 Finally, Florida
law 0 3 exempts from Florida usury limits loans made by savings
and loan associations and national banks when secured by first
liens on real estate.
IV. LENDER LIABILITY IN AN EQUITY LOAN
Since the lender in the equity participation loan shares in the
profits of the venture, it clearly has an interest in the project be-
yond that of a typical lender of money. Because of this, the bor-
rower's purchasers and suppliers may seek to make the lender vi-
cariously liable for defects in the property or other defaults of the
borrower in either payment or performance. This section will ex-
amine the extent to which the lender's equity participation interest
may subject it to such liability." 4
Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Association,10 5 was
the first case to hold a lender liable to purchasers for defective
construction. The court found the lender liable for financial losses
to the homebuyers resulting from the faulty foundations of their
homes.
Great Western required submission of plans, specifications,
101. Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 395 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1981);
see supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 66-94 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
104. For a general discussion of the construction lender's liability in the typical lending
transaction, see Reitz, Construction Lenders' Liability to Contractors, Subcontractors, and
Materialmen, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 416 (1981). The author analyzes "the extent to which
judicial relaxation of a contract privity requirement ...has increased the scope of con-
struction lender liability." Id. at 418. Cf. Pfeiler, Construction Lending and Products Lia-
bility, 25 Bus. LAW. 1309 (1970). The author explores the historical development of product
liability theory in residential construction, analyzes the effect of Connor v. Great Western
Savings and Loan Assoc., 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968) (en banc)
and subsequent cases in expanding the lender's liability to home purchasers for construction
defects and reviews the reaction of the California legislature and of a lower state court in
limiting Connor's effect. The author argues that such an expansion of liability is appropriate
only if the project and its participation in profits, assumes the role of a joint venturer with
the builder. Pfeiler, at 1332. But see Comment, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 379 (1968). The author
argues for the desirability of shifting the loss from the home purchaser to the construction
lender.
105. 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968) (en banc).
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and costs analyses. It employed a geologist to assure itself that suf-
ficient water was available. It did not, however, examine founda-
tion plans, require soil tests, or recommend design modifications.
Contrary to its usual practice, Great Western did not review and
approve plans and specifications before making its loan commit-
ment. Instead, it "was preoccupied with selling prices and sales," '
imposing a presale requirement for its loan commitment and sug-
gesting that the borrower increase its selling prices.
The court noted that there was no express joint venture be-
tween lender and borrower, and found that no joint venture could
be inferred because:
[a]lthough the profits of each were dependent on the overall suc-
cess of the development, neither was to share in the profits or
losses that the other might realize or suffer. Although each re-
ceived substantial payments as seller, lender, or borrower,
neither had an interest in the payments received by the other."0
The finding that vicarious liability was not present did not
prevent the court from imposing liability on Great Western on the
basis of its own negligence. In imposing such liability, the court
focused on Great Western's "extensive control of the enter-
prise," 108 which it could have exercised to prevent the harm. It also
focused on Great Western's role as something more than the usual
money-lender. The court reasoned that the lender breached a duty
of care to its own shareholders, and concluded that the lender's
conduct justified an extension of that duty to the plaintiffs. The
majority reasoned that imposing liability at the point of effective
financial control would encourage responsible building practices.
Although the Connor decision has been abrogated by statute 0 9 and
restricted in application by case law, it is the point of departure for
106. Id. at 860, 447 P.2d at 614, 73 Ca. Rptr. at 374.
107. Id. at 863, 447 P.2d at 615, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 375 (footnote omitted).
108. Id. at 864, 447 P.2d at 616, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
109. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3434 (West 1970). The statute provides:
A lender who makes a loan of money, the proceeds of which are used or may be
used by the borrower to finance the design, manufacture, construction, repair,
modification or improvement of real or personal property for sale or lease to
others, shall not be held liable to third persons for any loss or damage occa-
sioned by any defect in the real or personal property so designed, manufactured,
constructed, repaired, modified or improved or for any loss or damage resulting
from the failure of the borrower to use due care in the design, manufacturer,
construction, repair, modification or improvement of such real or personal prop-
erty, unless such loss or damage is a result of an act of the lender outside scope
of the activities of a lender of money or unless the lender has been a party to
misrepresentations with respect to such real or personal property.
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subsequent consideration of the lender's liability to its borrower's
purchasers.
The Florida courts have clearly held that a lender is not re-
sponsible to purchasers for construction defects if its role is strictly
confined to that of a pure lender of money.11 ° The cases are less
clear, however, in setting forth the special circumstances or addi-
tional control, short of a clear-cut joint venture or lender's usurpa-
tion of the builder's role, that would warrant the imposition of lia-
bility on the lender.
In First Wisconsin National Bank v. Roose,"' a condominium
owner filed a class action suit against the construction lender seek-
ing to hold the lender responsible for the builder's failure to main-
tain the project's recreational facilities. The plaintiff alleged that
the mortgagee knew that the project was insufficient security for
the loan, and further alleged that the value of the owners' apart-
ments was diminished by the developer's failure to perform. In
holding that these allegations did not establish the lender's liabil-
ity, the court outlined those that would have been sufficient:
There is no allegation of any agreement between the mortgagor
and mortgagee except the agreement for financing. There is no
allegation of a joint proprietary interest in the development.
There is no allegation of a community of interest in the per-
formance of a common purpose and no allegation that each
would share in the profits and losses." 2
Arguably, the lender holding an equity participation interest
could possess both a joint proprietary interest in the development
and a community of interest with the developer. Such a lender
would not, however, ordinarily share in the losses as well as the
profits of the venture, except to the extent that its loans were at
risk. Thus, the critical question after Roose is whether the court
intended an equity participant's liability to flow from the allega-
tion of any of the listed factors or whether it intended that every
factor be alleged before liability could be found.
An allegation that the lender conducted inspections of the
construction site and imposed an associated fee on the mortgagors
is not sufficient, however, to impose an implied duty on the lender
to conduct the inspections on the borrower's behalf or the pur-
110. Armetta v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 359 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); First
Wis. Nat'l Bank v. Roose, 348 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
111. 348 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
112. Id. at 611.
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chaser's behalf.11 3 The court in Armetta v. Clevetrust Realty In-
vestors'14 affirmed that Florida courts will not ordinarily hold a
construction lender liable to third parties as a result of project in-
spections intended for the lender's own protection. The court re-
jected a broad reading of Connor that would hold
a lender liable to third party purchasers of dwelling units con-
structed and sold by the developer-borrower. Absent unusual
circumstances. . . .provisions contained in a loan agreement
solely for the protection of the lender do not create a duty on
the part of the lender to others." 5
Citing First Wisconsin National Bank v. Roose,l l6 the court re-
peated that case's admonition that vicarious liability will not be
found when no "profits or losses were anticipated by the ...
lender beyond those anticipated as interest charged in the money
loaned."
'1 7
Liability because of the inspection effort have been imposed
when insurance companies, rather than construction lenders, have
made such inspections. In Hill v. United States Fidelity & Guar-
anty Co.," 8 an insurer was alleged to have made safety inspections
to detect conditions hazardous to hotel occupants. A subsequent
hotel fire injured the plaintiff, a hotel guest, and killed her hus-
band. The Fifth Circuit held that the complaint stated a cause of
action under Florida law for negligent performance of a duty owed
to a person not in privity with the actor, since the element of reli-
ance had been alleged. 1"9 The court relied on Gallachio v. Corpo-
rate Group Service, Inc.120 and Investment Corporation of Florida
113. Rice v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 207 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968).
114. 359 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
115. Id. at 543.
116. 348 So. 2d 610.
117. 359 So. 2d at 543 (emphasis added).
118. 428 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1970) (applying Florida law), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1008
(1971). The court cites the decisions of the Illinois courts in Nelson v. Union Wire Rope
Corp., 139 Ill. App. 2d 73, 187 N.E.2d 425 (1963), rev'd, 31 Ill. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769 (1964)
(applying Florida law). Although the Fifth Circuit asserts that the Illinois decision was not
binding on Florida courts, the court agreed that the Nelson decisions correctly described
Florida law when either the insured or a "third person for whose protection the services
should be recognized as necessary" relied on the insurer's inspections. Hill, 428 F.2d at 117.
The Illinois courts held the insurance company liable when there was such reliance.
119. Because reliance was alleged in Hill, the Fifth Circuit did not reach the question
of whether liability would be imposed on an insurance carrier without such reliance on its
safety inspections. Hill, 428 F.2d at 117.
120. 227 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969).
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v. Buchman. 2 ' Both cases involved defendants who owed a con-
tractual duty to each other and not to the plaintiff. The result in
Hill, therefore, could be sustained on the basis that the plaintiff
was a third party beneficiary of the contract between the hotel and
the insurer.
Inspections performed by a construction lender are distin-
guishable from those performed by an insurer. While insurers are
in the business of taking unknown risks and set their fees on the
basis of the likelihood of injury, construction lenders are in the
business of realizing a return on their capital, and may, like their
borrowers, seek to reduce their exposure to unknown risks by re-
quiring or securing hazard insurance. Second, while the insurer
may direct its inspections toward safety and, thus toward the ulti-
mate benefit of hotel guests and potential plaintiffs, the construc-
tion lender's inspection may have as its primary objective such
matters as determining the extent of completion of the project.
Third, in the case of inspection by construction lenders, the ele-
ment of reliance alleged in Hill would be absent, as the construc-
tion lender's inspections are not ordinarily intended to gauge the
safety of the building.
122
The Florida courts have found liability when the lender "took
title to the condominium project, completed construction, and,
holding [itself] out to be the developei 'and owner of the project,
advertised and sold units to purchasers.' 1 23 The court held the
lender "liable for performance of express representations made to
the buyer, for patent construction defects in the entire condomin-
ium project and for breach of any applicable warranties due to de-
fects in the portions of the project completed by [lender].' 24
In Blosam Contractors, Inc. v. Republic Mortgage Inves-
tors, ' 25 a lender that foreclosed on condominium units and received
the benefit of its security was held liable to a contractor for
$250,000 when the sum due to the contractor had not been dis-
bursed from the loan fund and the contractor's efforts had en-
hanced the value of the lender's security. The court imposed an
equitable lien on the undisbursed portion of the loan fund. Simi-
larly, the contractor in Fred S. Conrad Construction Co. v. Conti-
121. 208 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 216 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1968).
122. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
123. Chotka v. Fidelco Growth Investors, 383 So. 2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
124. Id.
125. 353 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 1978).
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nental Assurance Co.1 26 was held to have stated a cause of action
for undisbursed construction loan funds when it alleged that the
lender had not notified the surety and contractor of the borrower's
default but instead had allowed them to continue work, and when
the surety and contractor alleged that the lender's mortgage Was
not superior to the lien for completed work. Giffen Industries v.
Southeastern Associates, Inc. 27 summarizes the exceptions to the
rule that a laborer or materialman has no claim for an equitable
lien superior to the mortgage lien when the mortgagee forecloses
on an uncompleted project. The exceptions are when "there is
fraud on the part of a mortgagee" or when "a mortgagee has in
some way induced a materialman or laborer to forego taking action
which would have protected his interest."12
The point at which a lender becomes liable to purchasers of
the builder is not clearly delineated by the Florida courts. The
lender in Chotka v. Fidelco Growth Investors 29 had, in effect,
taken over the role of developer of the project. In contrast, a lender
who merely conducts inspections for its own protection without en-
joying a proprietary interest or participating in profits and losses is
not charged with liability to the purchaser. The opportunities for
diverse lender roles between these two extremes would appear to
be great. In different terms, the lender's liability may be predi-
cated on one of three bases: its vicarious liability arising from a
joint venture, its extensive and extraordinary control, and its duty
to perform inspections without negligence. In view of these bases
for liability, the key to the equity participant's exposure may
hinge, as previously noted,130 on whether its participation in losses
as well as profits is a necessary element of liability.
126. 215 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968), cert. denied, 222 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1969).
127. 357 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
128. Id. at 219.
129. 383 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
130. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the loss shar-
ing requirement in joint ventures, see Comment, Joint Adventures-The Sharing of Losses
Dilemma, 18 U. MIAMI L. REV. 429 (1963). The author argues that the Florida decisions
imposing the requirement that joint venturers share in losses as well as profits are inconsis-
tent. The author summarizes his argument by noting:
Perhaps the only assertion that may be made without fear of contradiction is
that Florida appears to require loss-sharing as a necessary prerequisite to the
existence of a joint adventure relationship. How it is to be recognized and in
what manner it must be presented and satisfied are more difficult questions




In Berkan v. Brown' summary judgment against a counter-
plaintiff who claimed that a joint venture existed was sustained on
the basis that no joint venture could have existed without an
agreement by the alleged joint venturers to participate in any
loss. 1 2 The purported joint venture was between sellers of an in-
terest in a cafeteria who became tenants in common in an interest
in notes secured by a chattel mortgage on the sale.
An allegation that a joint venture existed also failed in Kislak
v. Kreedian"I when the requisite agreement to share in losses as
well as profits was not shown. The plaintiff alleged that the defen-
dant wrongfully denied its joint-venture interest in a contract to
purchase certain property. The purported joint-venture agreement
was an oral one to purchase and develop a seven hundred lot tract
in Palm Beach County, Florida. The plaintiff's sole assertion that
it had always been ready to make its capital contribution was not
sufficient to show a joint venture in view of the size of the project,
the lack of a written agreement, and the failure of the complaint to
state the necessary allegation of an agreement to share in losses as
well as profits.
The court in Phillips v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Co.3 4 refined somewhat the sharing-of-losses requirement. Plaintiff
Phillips had agreed with Bates to enter the transportation broker-
age business. Phillips was named as the employer in the agreement
and was to furnish operating capital for the business. Bates was
designated employee, and was given a "draw" of $100 per week.
Net profits were to be divided equally between them. The action
arose when Phillips attempted to recover on a fidelity bond after
Bates' conversion of company funds. The issue of whether a part-
nership or joint venture existed between Phillips and Bates was
critical to Phillips' recovery attempt, as the insurance policy ex-
pressly excluded any loss caused by a partner of the insured. 35
The court held that no joint venture or partnership existed for
the sole reason "that the parties did not intend that Bates should
share in or be responsible for the losses, if any."' 36 The venture in
Uhrig v. Redding"37 was distinguished on the basis that, while one
131. 242 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970), cert. denied, 246 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1971).
132. Id. at 209.
133. 95 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1957).
134. 155 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963).
135. Id. at 416.
136. Id. at 418.
137. 150 Fla. 480, 8 So. 2d 4 (1942).
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party provided capital and the other services, the working partner
did not receive any compensation for his efforts. If the venture
were to have failed, he "would have exercised his skill and effort in
vain," while the monied partner would have suffered loss of his
capital.138 The working partner's "draw" of one hundred dollars in
Phillips saved the agreement from being held a joint venture when
there was also "no contemplation in the agreement for him to
share losses." 139 The court also provided a working definition of
"share of losses," which "means to be responsible or liable for the
losses created by the venture and liability, if any, to creditors or to
third parties.' 40 The court thereby extended the requirements for
the sharing of losses from the mere investment of labor without
return to the necessary financial exposure based on the success of
the enterprise. In Russell v. Thielen,14 1 the Florida Supreme Court
similarly held that a joint venture existed when the working part-
ner did not make a capital contribution per se, but instead stood to
lose monies invested in preparing vacant lots for sale, together
with their "more than two years of time and energy in promotion,
advertising and development."'
4
In Navarro v. Espino,143 the plaintiffs contended, and the
court affirmed, that they were joint venturers entitled to a one-
third interest, rather than mere lenders when they advanced the
funds that enabled the defendant to close on property, when they
were not to receive interest on the advance, and when they were
listed as officers of the developer entity. Further, there was testi-
mony that the plaintiffs were to have received shares of stock to
evidence their joint-venture interest. Since the litigation was ap-
parently prompted by the success of the project, the loss-sharing
requirement, while stated by the court, was not developed.
While the cases hardly provide a precise answer to whether a
lender with an equity participation interest could be construed to
be a joint-venture partner of the developer, and therefore vicari-
ously liable for the losses of the developer, they do provide some
guidance for the lender who wishes to avoid such exposure. The
problem is admittedly circular; that is, whether the lender could be
138. 155 So. 2d at 418 (quoting Redding, 150 Fla. at 484, 8 So. 2d at 6).
139. Id. at 419.
140. Id.
141. 82 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 1955); see also Florida Tomato Packers, Inc. v. Wilson, 296 So.
2d 536 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 327 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1976).
142. Russell, 82 So. 2d at 145.
143. 316 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).
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construed to be a joint venturer and responsible for losses depends
on whether there is a loss-sharing agreement in the first place.
Since the intention of the parties is critical to the formation of
a joint venture, the loan documents should contain an express reci-
tal that no joint-venture relationship is intended. The lender can
point to the absolute obligation to repay principal plus interest as
evidence that it does not have either seed capital or its own efforts
at risk; the contingent interest, while perhaps a "joint proprietary
interest in the subject matter" under the terms of joint-venture
law, would not constitute an investment loss to the lender, but
rather a reduction in its overall rate of return. The lender, consid-
ering further devices to reduce its exposure as a joint-venture part-
ner of the developer, may wish to consider the usury implications
of such measures since the existence of a joint venture or partner-
ship constitutes one exception to usury law.
V. CONCLUSION
The equity participation loan for the development and con-
struction of real estate projects may be viewed as something of a
hybrid: the lender participates in the profits but, except to the ex-
tent that its loan funds are at risk, does not share in the losses.
Thus, assuming that certain safeguards are taken, the loan invokes,
but does not fall within, the scope of joint-venture law.
Yet the lender's dependence on the success of the venture for
its equity participation may cause it to fall under the contingency
exception to the Florida usury statute. With careful drafting, the
parties may avoid an attack based on the indefiniteness of the con-
tingent interest obligation or one based on its effect as a restraint
on alienation.
The equity participation loan may be a solution to develop-
ment financing needs during periods of higher interest and tight
money, or when the speculative economics of a project make the
prospect of a high contingent return sufficiently attractive for the
lender to forego the maximization of its fixed return. The device's
attractiveness to the borrower stems from its reduction of the fixed
liability of stated interest, and the possibility that loan funds
would be available on a contingent interest basis when they might
not otherwise be offered.
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